I’m a fourth year PhD student in Economics at the Paris School of Economics under the supervision of Gilles Saint Paul. My research focuses on macroeconomics, households heterogeneity, and fiscal and monetary policies. I am currently doing a PhD Traineeship at the Directorate General Research of the European Central Bank.
The distributive effects of carbon taxation are critical for its political acceptability and depend on both income and geographic factors. Using French administrative data, household surveys, and matched employer-employee records, we document that rural households spend 2.7 times more on fossil fuels than urban households and are employed in firms that emit 3 times more greenhouse gases. We incorporate these insights into a spatial heterogeneous-agent model with endogenous migration and wealth accumulation, linking spatial and macroeconomic approaches. We find that rural households experience 20% higher welfare losses, and failing to account for geography in optimal revenue recycling lowers aggregate welfare by 7%.
What are the effects of central bank balance sheet expansion, and should we worry about central bank losses? Using a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian model incorporating money in utility and an endogenous zero lower bound (ZLB), we study the fiscal-monetary interaction of central bank balance sheet policies. We find that the overall efficiency of QE and QT policies depends on the combination of the expected future size of the balance sheet and the fiscal transmission of central bank losses. First, permanent balance sheet expansions stimulate the economy in the long-run and, by anticipation, increase inflation and output during the ZLB episode, as they interact with distortionary taxes and imperfect capital markets. Second, at the end of the ZLB, the central bank incurs losses: issuing securities to offset these losses is more welfare-enhancing than raising taxes.
Optimal public spending and inequality (Job Market Paper), with Charles Labrousse, March 2025.
Much of the existing literature models public spending as an exogenous, wasteful parameter, G. Attempts to assign a role to G either fall victim to the “chicken critique” (where governments possess a seemingly magical ability to satisfy households) or assume that transfers and in-kind benefits are perfect substitutes. This paper proposes a new theory of public spending overcoming these issues. First, we analytically demonstrate that when households value in-kind benefits as luxury goods, their optimal provision depends on inequality. Second, using household-level surveys and administrative data from the US and European countries, we show that education and health expenditures are indeed luxury goods. Third, we propose a new methodology to impute in-kind benefits in the distributional national accounts. Finally, we apply our luxury good theory to education policies and quantify the optimal level of transfers, public school provision and vouchers in a heterogeneous-agent model.
